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It is so ungenerous to always play the giver and the presenter and to show one’s face in 
the process. But to give and to present and to conceal one’s name and favour! Or to have 
no name, like nature in which what refreshes most of all is precisely that, finally and for 
once, we no longer encounter there a giver or a presenter, no longer a ‘gracious 
countenance’! – To be sure, you foolishly forfeit this refreshment as well, for you have 
stuck a God into nature – and now everything is once more unfree and uneasy!... 
(Nietzsche, Dawn 464)2 
 
 
One of the earliest references to Epicureanism in Nietzsche’s corpus is an incidental remark in 
Schopenhauer as Educator where he says that to write today in favour of an education that sets 
goals beyond money and acquisition, that takes a great deal of time, and also encourages 
solitude, is likely to de disparaged as ‘refined egoism’ and ‘immoral cultural Epicureanism’ (UM 
IV 6). Epicurus does not become an important component in Nietzsche’s published philosophy 
until around 1878-9 when he draws on him again and becomes inspired by certain Epicurean 
notions and ideals.  In the texts of the free spirit period Nietzsche is ploughing his own field and 
he knows well the charge that will be levelled against him: indulging precisely in immoral 
Epicureanism. Indeed, at this time he was inspired by Epicurus’s conception of friendship and 
the ideal of withdrawing from society and cultivating one’s own garden. He liked to refer to his 
philosophy as “my Epicurean garden” (KSB 5, 460). If philosophical therapeutics is centred on a 
concern with the healing of our own lives so as to return us to the joy of existing,3 then in the 
texts of his middle period Nietzsche can be seen to be an heir to this ancient Epicurean tradition. 
The difference is that he is developing a therapy for the sicknesses of the soul under modern 
conditions of social control and discipline. In a note from 1881 he states that he considers the 
various moral schools of antiquity to be ‘experimental laboratories’ containing a number of 
recipes for the art of living and holds that these experiments now belong to us as our legitimate 
property: “we shall not hesitate to adopt a Stoic recipe just because we have profited in the past 
from Epicurean recipes” (KSA 9, 15 [59]). Indeed, it is the case that in D Nietzsche draws on 
both Epicurus and Epictetus as a way of attacking the morality of living for others and promoting 
an ethics centred on self-cultivation.4  
In this paper I want to examine the character of this ethics as it centres on an Epicurean 
legacy and consider in particular critical concerns one might have about such an ethics. To 
illuminate some of the problems at hand I shall begin by referring to the work of Jean-Marie 
Guyau, a neglected philosopher from the second half of the 19th century with whose writings 
Nietzsche was familiar, and whose work I find especially fruitful for getting a critical handle on 
the legacy of an Epicurean ethics. The aim of the essay is to illuminate the character of the free-
minded ethics Nietzsche is espousing in his middle period texts.5  
  
 
Guyau on Epicurus 
 
Guyau (1854-88) is an impressive philosopher of the second half of the nineteenth century and 
the author of path-breaking books on ethics and the philosophy of life. Known at the time as ‘the 
Spinoza of France’, he was read by as an inspiring ‘immoralist’ in America by the likes of Josiah 
Royce and William James.6 Nietzsche tremendously admired his work even though he ultimately 
regarded him as a free thinker and not a genuine free spirit. Guyau’s major work on ethics was 
published in 1885 (Nietzsche read it at this time) and is entitled in English Sketch of Morality 
Independent of Obligation or Sanction [Esquisse d’une morale sans obligation, ni sanction].7 
Prior to this work Guyau had published studies of ancient and modern ethics (especially English 
utilitarianism), being especially concerned with Epictetus and Epicurus with regards to the 
ancients and with Darwin and Spencer with regards to the moderns. He also published an essay 
on ‘problems in contemporary aesthetics’ in 1884, and in 1887, a fascinating tome entitled The 
Non Religion (or Irreligion) of the Future, which Nietzsche also read and admired.8 
Guyau’s text on Epicurus was published in 1878 and is entitled The Morality of Epicurus 
and its Relation to Contemporary Doctrines. We know Nietzsche read and was familiar with 
Guyau’s major texts on morality and religion, but it is not known if he read this text. For Guyau, 
no other doctrine has been the object of more attacks and criticism than ancient and modern 
Epicureanism, and this is largely because it goes so strongly against received opinion on those 
things that are most dear to the human heart, notably morality and religion – the two topics we 
may note that become the centre of Nietzsche’s critical inquiries from 1878 onwards. Guyau 
praises Friedrich Albert Lange for showing the important role Epicurus’s ideas have played in 
the development of modern ideas and for placing Epicurus among the most seminal materialist 
thinkers. Moreover, “the moment seems to have arrived when we can more fairly appreciate the 
Epicurean doctrine and seek the portion of truth it contains.”9  
Guyau sees Epicureanism as representing several innovations in the critique of religion. 
He notes that the system of Hobbes is essentially irreligious: miracles are attacked, and the 
‘natural seed’ of religion is held to be in fear, ignorance, and man’s innate penchant for hasty 
conclusions. The Epicureans of the eighteenth century, such as La Mettrie, Helvetius, and 
d’Holbach, openly attack religion. Guyau cautions us to exercise philosophical restraint on this 
matter, however, since these thinkers failed to see “that the religious sentiment, existing in fact, 
had to be taken into account; that it represented a tendency, legitimate or not, of human nature, 
and that philosophy had to seek to satisfy it to a certain extent.”10 Finally, Guyau notes the 
successes of Epicureanism in his own time, with the cosmological systems of Democritus and 
Epicurus triumphing again in the natural sciences, and in the moral and social sciences the 
doctrines that derive from Epicureanism have received a vital renewal in the English school and 
this represents for him an advance over the Stoicism restored by Kant: “How many old ideas and 
rooted customs Epicureanism has contributed to ridding the moral domain of!”11 In the religious 
sphere Epicurus’s labours to liberate human thought from belief in the marvellous, the 
miraculous, and the providential will continue to live on and have an influence. Nietzsche, we 
can note, shares this preference for Epicureanism in relation to making advances in the scientific 
study of morality (see HH II WS 216).  
For Guyau the chief idea of the Epicurean doctrine is the ethical one: pleasure and pain 
are the sole forces that set being in motion and the sole levers by whose aid action is produced. 
Once this principle is posed it is held that the most appropriate morality for each individual is the 
act of securing for oneself the greatest amount of personal pleasure, or what a certain 
utilitarianism might call “the regularization of egoism.”12 As Guyau notes, “before Spinoza 
Hobbes attempted to construct a geometry of morals, Helvetius constructed a physic of morals, 
and d’Holbach a physiology of morals.”13 Guyau regards Epicurean morality as resting on a 
confusion of fact and duty, and sees the contemporary English school – Bentham, Stuart Mill and 
Spencer – as providing the necessary corrective, so that instead of personal pleasure being the 
sole legitimate end of our moral being, it is also the pleasure of others that needs to concern us. 
This was to become a key component in Guyau’s subsequent efforts to construe the future of 
morality. Here he expresses his position as follows, which is worth citing at length: 
When in thought we descend the scale of beings, we see that the sphere in which each of 
them moves is narrow and virtually closed. When on the contrary, we climb towards 
superior beings we see their sphere of action open up, expand, and increasingly mix with 
the sphere of action of other beings. The self is less and less distinguished from other 
selves; or rather, it has greater need of them in order to constitute itself and to survive. 
This scale that thought has just travelled, humankind has already travelled in part in its 
evolution. Its departure point was egoism, but egoism by virtue of the very fecundity of 
each life was led to grow, to create outside itself new centres for its own action. At the 
same time, sentiments correlative to this centrifugal tendency were slowly born and 
covered over the egoist principles that served as their principle. We are moving towards 
an era where egoism will retreat further and further within us, will be less and less 
recognizable. When that ideal era arrives, beings will no longer, so to speak, be able to 
enjoy in solitude: their pleasure will be like a concert where the pleasure of others will 
enter in as a necessary element…The predominant part played by sociable sentiments 
must be taken note of by every doctrine and in whatever we may conceive the principles 
of morality. No doctrine can close the human heart. We cannot mutilate ourselves, and 
pure egoism would be meaningless, an impossibility. In the same way that the ego is 
considered an illusion by contemporary psychology, that there is no personality, that we 
are composed of an infinite number of beings and tiny consciousnesses, in the same way 
we might say that egoist pleasure is an illusion: my pleasure does not exist without the 
pleasure of others…My pleasure, in order to lose nothing of its intensity, must maintain 
all of its extension.14 
 
Guyau regards ‘evolutionist morality’ as both a development of Epicureanism and also its 
best criticism. What is demonstrated by it is the insufficiency of the principle of pure egoism. It 
is this ‘egoism’, of course, and the appeal to the necessity of solitude, that Nietzsche will 
endeavour to revitalise in the texts of his free spirit period. He notes in Ecce Homo with respect 
to Dawn, simplifying in fact what he has actually done in the text, that it is with this work that 
his campaign against morality begins and that it centres on the claim that the morality of modern 
decadence, altruistic morality, takes itself to be morality itself, and he adds that he is the enemy 
of the “morality of unselfing.” (EH Destiny 3)  
The problem of pure egoism that Guyau is identifying is to be located for him in 
Epicurus’s original teaching. Although not lacking in ‘grandeur’ the teaching amounts to locking 
the self in upon itself. Given the definition of pleasure as a state of repose for both body and 
soul, a state of physical equilibrium and intellectual ataraxia, Epicurus deduces from it the ideal 
that for every human being the highest pleasure consists in retreating into the self and seeking 
everything within oneself without any external aid or repose. Guyau prefers Hobbes’s correction 
on this point, in which he maintains that pleasure “is in its essence movement, action, energy, 
consequently, progress” or forward movement: “To enjoy means to act, and acting means 
advancing.”15 Guyau insists that although pleasure is accompanied by an internal equilibrium 
and harmony of all our faculties, this is only a condition of pleasure that in fact allows for a more 
expansive action in all directions. Moreover, pleasure is not anything immobile but subject to the 
laws of universal evolution. Let me now look in some detail at how Guyau wishes to move 
beyond so-called Epicurean hedonism. I say so-called since it is a moot point to associate 
Epicurus’s teaching with hedonism. One commentator has incisively argued, for example, that 
Epicurus is mostly concerned with securing inner tranquillity or ataraxia and his philosophy of 
pleasure has to be seen as part of this overarching and overriding goal.16 Having noted this, let 
me stick with Epicureanism as a philosophy of pleasure and follow for now Guyau’s arguments 
against it.  
 
Life and Pleasure: Beyond Hedonism 
 
For Guyau, the cause operating within us before any attraction of pleasure is life.17 Pleasure is 
but the consequence of an instinctive effort to maintain and enlarge life, and nature is to be 
regarded as self-moving and self-governing. Guyau writes:  
One does not always act with the view of seeking a particular pleasure – limited and 
exterior to the act itself. Sometimes we act for the pleasure of acting…There is in us an 
accumulated force which demands to be used. If its expenditure is impeded, this force 
becomes desire or aversion; if the desire is satisfied, there is pleasure; if it is opposed, 
there is pain. But it does not follow from this that the stored-up activity unfolds itself 
solely for the sake of pleasure – with pleasure as motive. Life unfolds and expresses itself 
in activity because it is life. In all creatures pleasure accompanies, much more than it 
provokes, the search after life.18 
For Guyau, Epicurus, along with his faulty thinking about evolution, in which pleasure is said to 
create an organ’s function, needs correcting on this point. In addition, he argues contra Bentham 
that “to live is not to calculate, it is to act.”19 An essentially Spinozist position – the tendency to 
persist in life is the necessary law of life – is deduced: “The tendency of the creature to continue 
in existence is at the root of all desire, without forming in itself a determinate desire.”20 Guyau 
takes this tendency to be one that goes beyond and envelops conscious life, so it is “both the 
most radical of realities and the inevitable ideal.”21 Therefore, Guyau reaches the conclusion that 
the part of morality that can be founded on positive facts can be defined as, “the science which 
has for object all the means of preserving and enlarging material and intellectual life.”22 His 
ethics centre, then, on a desire to increase ‘the intensity of life’ which consists in enlarging the 
range of activity under all its forms and that is compatible with the renewal of force.23 A superior 
being is one that practices a variety of action; thought itself is nothing other than condensed 
action and life at its maximum development. He defines this superior being as one which “unites 
the most delicate sensibility with the strongest will.”24  
Although the evolved human being possesses a source of varied enjoyment in its own 
activity, this does not mean that such a human being will decide to shut itself up in itself, 
establishing an autarchic realm of self-sufficiency, like some Stoic sage. For Guyau, intellectual 
pleasures are both the most inward pleasures and also the most communicative, being both 
individual and social. The bonds that the sharing of the higher pleasures can generate create a 
particular kind of obligation: “an emotional bond –a union produced by the complete, or partial, 
harmony of sentiments or thoughts.”25 Guyau does not, of course, deny that there is often conflict 
and disagreement over values and ideals, but at the same he insists new bonds between 
individuals arise from the sharing of the higher pleasures. Indeed, he maintains that the higher 
we rise in the scale of evolution, the more we see the highly social and sociable character of the 
pleasures of humankind.  
We moderns are becoming more intellectual in our enjoyments and tastes, and with this 
arises a ‘universal consciousness,’ in which consciousness becomes easier of penetration.26 It is 
on this point that Guyau thinks we are going beyond the life of pleasures envisaged by Epicurean 
philosophy. In modern conditions of human social evolution we find that the self distinguishes 
itself less and less from other selves and, in fact, has more in need of them so as to form itself 
and flourish. Here Guyau locates an important principle of human evolution: although the point 
of departure is selfishness, it is such “by virtue of the very fecundity of all life,” and it is 
“obliged to enlarge itself, to create outside of itself new centres of its own action.”27 For Guyau, 
then, human evolution is on the way to an epoch in which primitive selfishness will more and 
more recede. Compared to the selfish component of our existence, the sphere of altruism is 
becoming considerably larger and even the so-called purely physical pleasures, such as eating 
and drinking, only acquire their full charm when one shares them with others. The social 
sentiments are, then, of crucial importance for understanding the character of our enjoyments 
and pains: “Neither my sufferings nor my pleasures are absolutely my own.”28 
There is for Guyau an abundance of life that motivates us to care and work not only for 
ourselves but for others. This is, in large part, what he means when he seeks to locate “morality” 
– the sphere of the social expansion of the human animal and of other-regarding actions – within 
life itself. Life has two main aspects: nutrition and assimilation, on the one hand, and, production 
and fecundity on the other. The more a life form takes in, the more it needs to give out. Even in 
the life of the cell we can locate a principle of expansion and one that prevents any individual 
being sufficient unto itself. Moreover, the ‘richest life’ is to be found in the life that lavishly 
spends itself, sacrificing itself within certain limits, and sharing itself with others. The most 
perfect organism will also be the most sociable being: not simply because this carries with it 
certain evolutionary advantages but also because it is part of the higher moral development of 
life itself. It is on this point that Guyau sharply distinguishes himself from the likes of Bentham 
and the school of utilitarianism. It is within the very depths of our being that the instincts of 
sympathy and sociability emerge and that the English school has shown us to be more or less 
artificially acquired in the course of human evolution, so being little more than adventitious in 
consequence.  
For Guyau the higher life is that which expands beyond the narrow horizon of the 
individual self. We have, he thinks, a need to go out of ourselves to others: “we want to multiply 
ourselves by communion of thoughts and sentiments.”29 We enjoy others knowing that we exist, 
feel, suffer, and love. In this respect, then, “we tear the veil of individuality,” and this is not 
simple vanity but a fecund desire to “burst the narrow shell of the self.”30 Guyau, however, is not 
naïve in his appreciation of ‘life’: he draws our attention to the phenomenon of “affective 
debauchery” in which ones lives too much for others and neglects a healthy care of self.31 So, 
although he is keen to attack what he sees as the dogmatism of egoism,32 he also appreciates the 
need for a healthy form of egoism consisting in the cultivation of a care of self. 
 
 
Middle Period Nietzsche 
 
In turning to Nietzsche I want to focus largely on his middle period, especially the text Dawn. At 
this point in his intellectual development Nietzsche has no philosophy of life, such as might be 
encapsulated in the doctrine of the will to power, and he does not express the concerns about 
Epicurus that characterise his late writings, such as the criticism of decadence (see AC 30, 58). 
So, we find Nietzsche at a definite point in his development, the point as he puts it in D of a 
“moral interregnum” (D 453), and he is happy to cultivate his Epicurean garden.  For Nietzsche, 
Epicurus experiences a oneness with nature and attains serenity in the face of the tumultuous 
character of existence.  Moreover, although Epicurus suffers from existence it is the suffering 
that gives his achievement of happiness a profound meaning (GS 45).  Nietzsche appears to be 
inspired by Epicurus’s cultivation of a voluptuous but modest appreciation of existence, as well 
as by the attainment of serenity through a practice of psychic tranquillity:  Nietzsche has a 
special take on Epicurean ataraxia.  Nietzsche’s Epicurean-inspired doctrine at this time is 
clearly stated in aphorism 338 of The Gay Science, and I quote from it: 
Live in seclusion so that you can live for yourself. Live in ignorance about what seems 
most important to your age…the clamor of today, the noise of wars and revolutions 
should be a mere murmur for you. You will also wish to help – but only those whose 
distress you understand entirely because they share with you one suffering and one hope 
– your friends – and only in the manner in which you help yourself (GS 338). 
We need to be careful in thinking how best to interpret such a doctrine, and in my view it would 
be too hasty to level criticisms at Nietzsche for neglecting the critical observations on Epicurean 
teaching we find, for example, in Guyau. This is because Nietzsche at this time is undertaking a 
specific project of ethical reformation and has specific reasons for wanting to promote an ethics 
of self-cultivation. Of course, we can question whether these reasons are well founded or not and 
whether they belie even a misanthropic or sociopathic set of sentiments on his part. My view is 
that this is going too far, though it is clear that his free-thinking project does at times give the 
appearance of bordering on these tendencies, but this we might say is part of the risks undertaken 
by a free-spirited project of ethical reformation, if decidedly not one of revolution: Nietzsche’s 
project is one of what he calls “small doses” (D 534) and “slow cures” (D 462). Unlike Guyau, 
Nietzsche does not and cannot appeal to the interests of a broadened humanity as a whole, 
though he clearly favours an Enlightenment project, and hence his suspicions about love and the 
philanthropic sentiment that he regards as informing a great deal of the modern moral sensibility 
and that he has little time for. Let me now explore this set of issues in a little more detail.  
What are the concerns we might have over Nietzsche’s project and how might a close 
reading of the texts yield a subtler Nietzsche on ethical matters? It is widely thought that 
Nietzsche invokes a notion of subjectivity as self-absorbed, as something whole to itself fully 
represented and self-contained.33 In his consideration of the “self and other in Nietzsche,” Elliot 
Jurist notes that Nietzsche’s concern is with self-gratification – with such things as narcissism, 
instinctual satisfaction, and the will to power – and argues that this concern “interferes with the 
way he characterizes the relationship between self and others,” and, moreover, that he leaves the 
issue of our relation to others unresolved: “Nietzsche himself acknowledges the social 
constitution of agency; yet he opts not to pursue this and not to concentrate fully on coming to 
terms with the experience of being-for-another.”34 Jurist notes the complexity and intricacy, if 
not the delicacy, of Nietzsche’s actual position or set of positions when he comments on the fact 
that “competing tendencies” characterize Nietzsche’s attitude towards others. So, on the one 
hand, Jurist contends, we encounter him seemingly countenancing cruelty and exploitation, and 
repeatedly stressing the need for solitude. And yet, on the other hand, we see him approaching 
the study of human relationships “with a subtlety and a psychological astuteness that should not 
be overlooked.”35  
 As Ruth Abbey notes, Nietzsche’s purpose in attacking the presumptions and prejudices 
of morality, for example, through conducting a genealogy of morality, is practical. He wants to 
discredit and demote values that promote the common interest and so as to clear the ground for 
the creation and resurgence of those that foster and ethics of individual self-care and self-
fashioning. This extends to his re-appraisal of the value of self-love, in which, as Nietzsche 
writes, we are to forgive ourselves for our own ego and love ourselves as an act of clemency.36 
Only individuals who experience this love of self are capable of generous and beautiful actions. 
It becomes necessary, then, for Nietzsche to strip egoism and self-love of their usual adverse 
connotations, as when he states “egoism is not evil” (HH I 101)37 This does not mean for him, of 
course, that all is vanity or that while all action might derive from egoism all egoism is the 
same.38  We need to distinguish between types of egoism and distinguish between crude and 
immature egoism and egoism that is mature and refined.   
I think it prudent to bear in mind a point astutely made by Abbey, namely, that 
Nietzsche’s supposedly scientific analyses of morality have a therapeutic intent, so that when he 
praises egoism, rather just describing it, he is “deliberately compensating for the calumny it has 
suffered and continues to suffer in moral frameworks.”39 Still, it is important that Nietzsche 
provide his readers with models of the relation between the self and its others.  As we shall see, it 
is far-fetched to claim, as Jurist does, that Nietzsche is more concerned with narcissism than he is 
with relatedness.40 Again, the context of Nietzsche’s “campaign” against morality, as he calls it, 
is of crucial importance: he is advancing an ethics of self-cultivation as an ethics of resistance 
and in the context of his worries over the moral tendencies of commercial society. Let me turn to 
this.  
 
Dawn’s Campaign Against Morality 
 
The ‘campaign’ centres largely on a critique of what Nietzsche sees as the modern tendency, the 
tendency of his own century, to identify morality with the sympathetic affects and compassion 
[Mitleid], so as to give us a ‘definition’ of morality. Throughout D, Nietzsche operates with 
several critical conceptions of morality. He is keen to attack the view that everything that exists 
has a connection with morality and thus a moral significance can be projected onto the world (D 
3, 90, 100, 197, 563). He voices an opposition to both “picturesque morality” (D 141) and “petty 
bourgeois morality” (D 146), and speaks of his own “audacious morality” [verwegenen 
Moralität] (D 432). With regards to the modern prejudice, which is one of the main foci of his 
polemic in the book, here there is the presumption that we know “what actually constitutes 
morality”: “It seems to do every single person good these days to hear that society is on the road 
to adapting the individual to fit the needs of the throng and that the individual’s happiness as 
well as his sacrifice consist in feeling himself to be a useful member of the whole…” (D 132) As 
Nietzsche sees it, then, the modern emphasis is on defining the moral in terms of the sympathetic 
affects and compassion [Mitleid]. We can, he thinks, explain the modern in terms of a movement 
towards managing more cheaply, safely, and uniformly individuals in terms of “large bodies and 
their limbs.” This, he says, is “the basic moral current of our age”: “Everything that in some way 
supports both this drive to form bodies and limbs and its abetting drives is felt to be good…” (D 
132) 
For Nietzsche, then, the principal presumption that holds sway in the Europe of his day is 
that the sympathetic affects define the essence of the moral, such as actions deemed to be 
congenial, disinterested, of general utility, and so on. He also thinks we are busy building a 
society of “security” in which the chief goal is to protect individuals from various hazards of life 
and so reduce human suffering and conflict. In Dawn Nietzsche’s focus is not, as is widely 
supposed, on Christianity as the religion of pity or compassion – he maintains that until the 
eighteenth century such a virtue was a subsidiary and nonessential aspect of this religion. The 
view that morality means nothing other than disinterested, useful, and congenial actions is the 
residuum of Christian sentiments once the strictly egotistical, foundational belief in the 
importance of eternal personal salvation, and the dogmas on which this belief rested, receded and 
there then came into the foreground ancillary beliefs in love and love thy neighbour which 
harmonized with ecclesiastical charity. There emerges in modernity a cult of love for humanity 
and the idea of surpassing the Christian ideal became, “a secret spur of all French freethinkers 
from Voltaire through to August Comte,” for example, the latter’s moral formula of “vivre pour 
autrui [live for others]” (D 132). 
Nietzsche’s main target in the book, then, is what he sees as the fundamental tendency of 
modern commercial society and its attempt at a “collectivity-building project that aims at 
disciplining bodies and selves and integrating them into a uniform whole.”41 Here ‘morality’ 
denotes the means of adapting the individual to the needs of the whole, making him a useful 
member of society. This requires that every individual is made to feel, as its primary emotion, a 
connectedness or bondedness with the whole, with society, in which anything truly ‘individual’ 
is regarded as prodigal, costly, inimical, extravagant, and so on. Nietzsche’s great worry is that 
genuine individuality and a healthy concern with self-fashioning will be sacrificed and this, in 
large part, informs his critique of what he sees as the cult of sympathetic affects within 
modernity.  
In the book Nietzsche devotes a significant number of sections to the topic of the affect of 
compassion [Mitleid], largely concentrated in book two of the text. His aim is to outline some of 
the perspectives by which we can gain some genuinely reflective insight into the affect of 
compassion and to encourage us to pursue critical lines of inquiry, so compassion [Mitleid] will 
be shown to be not a pure other-regarding affection, to be an injurious affect, to have value for 
specific cultures, and so on (D 132-138).42 His criticism rests on a number of concerns. Let me 
mention two.  
 
(a) A concern that in extolling compassion as the panacea to our moral anxieties we are in danger 
of existing as fantasists. Nietzsche wonders whether people speak with such idolatry about love – 
the “food of the gods” - simply because they have had so little of it. But would not a utopia of 
universal love be something ludicrous? – “each person flocked around, pestered, longed for not 
by one love…but by thousands, indeed by each and everyone.” (D 147) Instead, Nietzsche wants 
us to favour a future of solitude, quietude, and even being unpopular. The imperatives of 
philosophies of universal love and compassion will serve only to destroy us. If they tempt us we 
should put them to the test and stop all our fantasizing. (D 137)  
 
(b) A concern that in its cult of the sympathetic affects modern society is in danger of providing 
the image of a single moral-making morality that amounts to a tyrannical encroachment on the 
requirements of individual self-cultivation. In an essay on pity and mercy in Nietzsche, Martha 
Nussbaum argues that Nietzsche’s project is one that aims to bring about a revival of Stoic 
values – self-command and self-formation – within a post-Christian and post-Romantic context 
(she criticizes him for this Stoicism).43 The picture frequently presented is one of Nietzsche 
advocating, in place of an ethics of sympathy or compassion, one of idiosyncratic self-assertion 
or the value of unbridled egoism. This is, clearly, a caricature, and fails to capture what we might 
call the Stoic demands Nietzsche places on the self and its cultivation: harshness toward oneself, 
self-discipline, self-control, honesty, and a profound love of fate.44 An important aphorism in this 
regard is 139, which runs:  
You say that the morality of being compassionate is a higher morality [Moral] than that 
of Stoicism? Prove it! But remember that what is ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ in morality is not, 
in turn to be measured by a moral yardstick: for there is no absolute morality [Moral]. So 
take your rule from somewhere else – and now beware! (D 139)  
 
Here we see Nietzsche contesting the idea that there is a single moral-making morality – he 
never contests the idea that morality is necessary, only that there is a single, absolute conception 
of it. However, other models of the self and its relation to others are offered in D, as we shall see, 
and these serve to complicate the sage model of complete self-sufficiency and isolated aloofness 
that we might attribute to Nietzsche.  
It is clear that Nietzsche is not in D advocating the overcoming of all possible forms of 
morality. Where morality centres on “continual self-command and self-overcoming…in great 
things and in the smallest,” he champions it (HH II WS 45). His concern is that “morality” in the 
forms it has assumed in the greater part of human history, right up to Kant’s moral law, has 
opened up an abundance of sources of displeasure and to the point that one can say that with 
every “refinement in morality” [Sittlichkeit] human beings have grown “more and more 
dissatisfied with themselves, their neighbour, and their lot…” (D 106) The individual in search 
of happiness, and who wishes to become its own lawgiver, cannot be treated with prescriptions 
to the path to happiness simply because individual happiness springs from one’s own unknown 
laws and external prescriptions only serve to obstruct and hinder it: “The so-called ‘moral’ 
precepts are, in truth, directed against individuals and are in no way aimed at promoting their 
happiness.” (D 108) Indeed, Nietzsche himself does not intend to lay down precepts for 
everyone. As he writes, “One should seek out limited circles and seek and promote the morality 
appropriate to them.” (D 194) Up to now, Nietzsche notes, the moral law has been supposed to 
stand above our personal likes and dislikes; we did not want to impose this law upon ourselves 
but preferred to take it from somewhere or have it commanded to us. If we examine what is often 
taken to be the summit of the moral in philosophy - the mastery of the affects – we find that there 
is pleasure to be taken in this mastery. I can impress myself by what I can deny, defer, resist, and 
so on. It is through this mastery that I grow and develop. And yet morality, as we moderns have 
come to understand it, would have to give this ethical self-mastery a bad conscience. If we take 
as our criterion of the moral to be self-sacrificing resolution and self-denial, we would have to 
say, if being honest, that such acts are not performed strictly for the sake of others; my own 
fulfilment and pride are at work and the other provides the self with an opportunity to relieve 
itself through self-denial. 
The morality that humanity has cultivated and dedicated itself to is one of “enthusiastic 
devotion” and “living for others” in which it looks down from certain exalted heights on the 
more sober morality of self-control (which is regarded as egotistical). Nietzsche suggests the 
reason why morality has been developed in this way is owing to the enjoyment of the state of 
intoxication which has stemmed from the thought that the person is at one with the powerful 
being to whom it consecrates itself; in this way “the feeling of power” is enjoyed and is 
confirmed by a sacrifice of the self. For Nietzsche such an overcoming of the self is impossible: 
“In truth you only seem to sacrifice yourselves; instead, in your thoughts you transform 
yourselves into gods and take pleasure in yourselves as such.” (D 215) In examining the inflated 
character of moral thinking and language Nietzsche is dealing with a problem that preoccupies 
him in his middle period: the problem of fanaticism. As he notes at one point in the text, such 
“enthusiasts” will seek to implant the faith in intoxication “as the life within life: a terrible faith!” 
(D 50) Such is the extent of Nietzsche’s anxiety that he wonders whether humanity as a whole 
will one day perish by its spiritual fire-waters and by those who keep alive the desire for them. 
The “strange madness of moral judgements” is bound up with states of exaltation and “the most 
exalted language.” (D 189) 
Nietzsche appeals to the Stoic Epictetus for an example of a non-fanatical mode of living 
and as a counterweight to modern idealists who are greedy for expansion. Epictetus’s ideal 
human being, lacking all fear of God and believing strictly in reason, “is not a preacher of 
penitence.” (D 546) Although this ancient thinker was a slave, the exemplar he invokes is 
without class and is possible in every class. Nietzsche also admires Epictetus on account of his 
dedication to his own ego and for resisting the glorification of thinking and living for others. (D 
131) Of course, this is a partial and selective appropriation of Epictetus on Nietzsche’s part. 
Although his chief concerns are with integrity and self-command, Epictetus is also known for his 
Stoic cosmopolitanism in which individuals have an obligation to care for their fellow human 
beings, and Nietzsche is silent about this aspect of Stoic teaching.45 Nevertheless, it is true that 
the ethical outlook of Epictetus does invite people “to value their individual selves over 
everything else,”46 and for Nietzsche he serves as a useful contrast to Christian thinkers such as 
Pascal, who considered the ego to be something hateful: 
 
If, as Pascal and Christianity claim, our ego [Ich] is always hateful, how might we 
possibly ever allow or assume that someone else could love it – be it God or a human 
being! It would go against all decency to let oneself be loved knowing full well that one 
only deserves hate – not to mention other feelings of repulsion. - ‘But this is precisely the 
kingdom of mercy’. – So is your love-thy-neighbour mercy? Your compassion mercy? 
Well, if these things are possible for you, go still one step further: love yourselves out of 
mercy – then you won’t need your God any more at all, and the whole drama of original 
sin and redemption will play itself out to the end in you yourselves. (D 79)  
We are to look askance at impatient political invalids who seek change through the 
bloody quackery of revolution and instead carry out small, personal experiments, establishing 
ourselves as our own reges (D 453). In the future, Nietzsche hopes, the inventive and fructifying 
person shall no longer be sacrificed and “numerous novel experiments shall be made in ways of 
life and modes of society” (D 164). When this takes place we will find that an enormous load of 
guilty conscience has been purged from the world. Humanity has suffered for too long from 
teachers of morality who wanted too much all at once and sought to lay down precepts for 
everyone (D 194). In the future, care will need to be given to the most personal questions and 
create time for them (D 196). Small individual questions and experiments are no longer to be 
viewed with contempt and impatience (D 547). Contra the presumptions of morality, then, he 
holds that we ourselves are experiments and our task should be to want to be such (D 543). In 
place of the ruling ethic of sympathy and self-sacrifice, which can assume the form of a 
“tyrannical encroachment,” Nietzsche invites individuals to engage in self-fashioning, cultivating 
a self that others can behold with pleasure, a “lovely, peaceful, self-enclosed garden…with high 
walls to protect against the dangers and dust of the roadway, but with a hospitable gate as well” 
(D 174).47  
Nietzsche acknowledges, then, that there is a need for the self to express, albeit in a 
subtle manner, its altruistic drive. However, the question remains: in all of this concern with 
finding and inventing one’s self, through modes of self-cultivation, what of the relation of the 
self to others? To negotiate this question I now want to turn in the final part of the essay to a 
reading of one particular aphorism in D, an especially intriguing one.   
 
 
A Reading of Dawn 449 
 
 
Ah! How it nauseates me to impose my thoughts on another! How I take pleasure in 
every mood and secret conversion within myself by which the thoughts of others prevail 
over my own! From time to time there occurs an even higher celebration, when for a 
change one is allowed to give away one’s spiritual house and possessions like the father 
confessor who sits in the corner, eager for one in need to come and recount the travail of 
his thoughts in order that he, the father confessor, might once again fill his hand and heart 
and lighten his burdened soul. Not only does he eschew all praise for what he does: he 
would also like to avoid any gratitude, for gratitude is invasive and has no respect for 
solitude and silence. He seeks to live nameless or lightly ridiculed, too humble to awaken 
envy or enmity, armed with a head free of fever, a handful of knowledge and a bag full of 
experiences, to be, as it were, a doctor of the spirit to the indigent and to aid people here 
and there whose head is disturbed by opinions without their really noticing who has 
helped him! Not to be right vis-à-vis this person and to celebrate a victory, but to speak 
with him in such a way that, after a tiny unobserved hint or objections, he himself says 
what is right and, proud of the fact, walks away! Like a modest hostel that turns away no 
one in need, that is, however, forgotten about afterward or laughed at! To have no 
advantage, neither better food, nor purer air, nor a more joyful spirit – but to share, to 
give back, to communicate, to grow poorer! To be able to be humble so as to be 
accessible to many and humiliating to none! To have experienced much injustice and 
have crawled through the worm-tunnels of every kind of error in order to be able to reach 
many hidden souls along their secret paths! Always in a type of love and a type of self-
interest and self-enjoyment! To be in possession of a dominion and at the same time 
inconspicuous and renouncing! To lie constantly in the sun and the kindness of grace and 
yet to know that the paths rising to the sublime [zum Erhabenen] are right at hand! – That 
would be a life! That would be a reason to live, to live a long time. (D 449) 
 
This aphorism poses a number of interpretive challenges, and it is clearly central to any 
interpretation of Nietzsche on the relation between the self and others. The way Nietzsche 
envisages this relation is extraordinarily complicated. In this aphorism Nietzsche is envisaging a 
modest existence for the self, moving from matters of the body (not indulging oneself with better 
food) to matters of the soul (not even having a more joyful spirit), and entailing a mode of 
existence that shares, returns, and communicates, freely making oneself poor in this manner of 
being and dwelling. Indeed, he refers to it as a ‘humble’ mode of living, one that is accessible to 
many and does not entail humiliating anyone. One suffers from existence, such is the 
vulnerability of the self, and yet still profits from one’s experiences of life and to the point where 
one can aid and instruct others. One can love and one can attend to the needs and cares of the 
self. One constructs one’s dominion but in a way that is not self-centred but, in fact, ‘self-
renouncing’. Living in this manner one can wish to live well and live a long time: one is 
ascending paths to the sublime, that is, peaks of elevated existence in which from the vantage 
point of the heights one has climbed one can look down upon the experiences of life that have 
been conquered and overcome. The portrait depicted seems to be that of some new sage, a person 
who has tempered emotional and mental excess, so is “armed with a head free of fever, a handful 
of knowledge and a bag full of experiences,” and can be a “doctor of the spirit to the indigent,” 
aiding people whose heads are subject to the reign of doxa. One lives without praise or gratitude, 
silently and even namelessly. The aid offered to the other is, therefore, of a delicate kind: one 
seeks to preserve one’s own space in the process and to ensure that the integrity of the other 
person is respected. “Love” is perhaps a strong word for Nietzsche to use in this example, but he 
is clearly hinting at a special mode of care of others, and one that is not at all free of self-interest 
and self-enjoyment.  
 Such an aphorism clearly shows that Nietzsche’s campaign against morality, by which he 
means the “morality of unselfing,” possesses a complicated character, at least as it is articulated 
in Dawn. Nietzsche’s focus on the self and on egoism is of a highly ethical character and in two 
senses: (a) it has a concern with self-cultivation; (b) this cultivation is not without care for others, 
including the duties and responsibilities that come with such care. Here we can agree with 
Foucault’s insight into the paradox of a precept of care of self that signifies for us today either 
egoism or withdrawal, but which for centuries was a positive principle, serving as the matrix for 
dedicated moralities. Christianity and the modern world have based the codes of moral strictness 
on a morality of non-egoism to the point where we forget that such codes originated in an 
environment marked by the obligation to take care of oneself.48  Martha Nussbaum claims that in 
his cult of Stoic strength Nietzsche depicts “a fearful person, a person who is determined to seal 
himself off from risk, even at the cost of loss of love and value”.49  Like the otherworldliness he 
abhors, the Stoicism he endorses is a form of self-protection, expressing “a fear of this world and 
its contingencies” (ibid.).  However, Dawn 449 clearly shows that Nietzsche is open to a doctrine 
of love, albeit of an unconventional kind, and that he is not advocating an ethic of a retreat into 
the self, one that would be independent of specifically human relations of care and openness to 
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